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MARK O. VAN WAGONER,
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Defendant/Appellant,
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PARTIES
All parties to this appeal appear in the caption.

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section
78-2a-3(h), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is the husband's appeal from an alimony award entered by the
District Court.

ISSUE
Respondent accepts Appellant's statement of the issue.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

No particular constitutional provision or statute is determinative of
the outcome of this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff-Respondent

Carol

Van

Wagoner

(hereinafter

"Mrs. Van Wagoner") does not dispute the Statement of Facts set forth by
Defendant-Appellant Mark O. Van Wagoner (hereinafter "Mr. Van Wagoner").1 She
believes, however, that the following additional facts are necessary to a full
understanding and evaluation of the issue on appeal.
The parties were married almost nineteen years ago, in September
of 1970. (Stipulated Statements of Facts at 52, R. at 616, reproduced infra, at A-2.)
During the tenure of the marriage, Mr. Van Wagoner attended law school,
graduated, and became an associate employed by one of the largest and most
prestigious west coast law firms, O'Melveny & Myers. In 1980, he moved to Salt
Lake City {Id. at 510), believing that he could earn more money here with the law
firm Greene, Callister & Nebeker than with the O'Melveny & Myers firm in

*As noted by Appellant, the court reporter has been unable to locate any of her
machine notes from the trial. The parties have arrived at a Stipulation concerning
the facts, which is reproduced in the Addendum at A-2 through A-6. The parties
have also stipulated that the Depositions of both parties may be considered as
evidence by this Court. Additionally, the District Court's extensive Amended
Findings of Fact are reproduced in the Addendum at A-7 through A-22.
2
i

metropolitan Los Angeles (App. Depo. at 7). Shortly before the parties separation,
he left Greene, Callister & Nebeker to found the firm of Van Wagoner & Stevens.
(Id. at 8.)
During the two years prior to the hearing before the District Court
on the parties' financial matters (/.&, 1985 and 1986), Mr. Van Wagoner averaged
an earned income of at least $70,000.00 per year. (Amended Findings of Fact at
516, R. at 447, reproduced infra, at A-7.) Additionally, at the time of the hearing
before the District Court, he was in the process of handling on behalf of the Plaintiff
a substantial wrongful death action against a major retail grocer.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A great deal of deference is accorded to the trial judge in domestic
relations matters because the trial judge has had an opportunity to observe the
parties and become familiar with their economic resources. The alimony awarded
by the District Court will not be changed on appeal unless some manifest abuse of
discretion or misapplication of law is clearly demonstrated.
During

the

19 years that

these

parties

were

married,

Mr. Van Wagoner completed his undergraduate education, attended law school,
became associated with a large Los Angeles law firm, and now heads his own firm
here in Salt Lake City. Mrs. Van Wagoner, on the other hand, was found by the
District Court to be earning a little less than $10,000.00 per year and has, according
to Mr. Van Wagoner's own evidence only, the capability of earning $16,000.00 per
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year. During the last twelve years of the marriage, Mrs. Van Wagoner devoted
herself to raising the parties' three children and to the performance of various
volunteer civic services, but she was not employed. Under these circumstances, the
permanent alimony in the modest amount of $650.00 per month awarded by Judge
Moffat is entirely consistent with Utah law. Mr. Van Wagoner has failed to cite a
single case that actually supports his contention that permanent alimony was
erroneous.
Based upon the circumstances of these parties and the fact that the
modest permanent alimony awarded was clearly consistent with firmly established
Utah law, Mrs. Van Wagoner should be awarded the costs and counsel fees incurred
by her on this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED ALIMONY AWARD IS PRESUMED
PROPER AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED ABSENT A CLEAR SHOWING BY
THE APPELLANT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
OR WAS MISTAKEN AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW.
It is apparent from Appellant's Brief that Mr. Van Wagoner is not
pleased with Judge Moffat's award of $650.00 per month in "permanent" alimony to
his former wife. However, the fact that one of the parties to a divorce proceeding
is dissatisfied with the District Court's rulings is not indicative either of the propriety
or of the merit of those rulings; nor or such remonstrances unusual in the aftermath
of the inherently emotional and psychologically traumatic divorce process.
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This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have, on innumerable
occasions, held that while a divorce action is equitable in nature, the ruling of the
trial judge is favored with a presumption of propriety and accuracy. It is only in
those few instances in which the Appellant can clearly demonstrate a manifest abuse
of discretion or misapplication of law that the Decree fashioned by the trial judge
will be disturbed.

Such a position is logically grounded upon the advantaged

position of the District Court, who has observed the witnesses, heard the testimony,
and become acquainted at least to a limited degree with the parties, their problems,
and their properties.
In tacit recognition of the fact that the Amended Findings of Fact
entered by Judge Moffat

are supported by sufficient

credible evidence,

Mr. Van Wagoner relies on the equitable nature of divorce proceedings in his
invitation to this Court to revamp the alimony award. A similar invitation was
refused by the Utah Supreme Court in Eastman v. Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 (Utah
1976), with the observation that:
We have many times stated that even though
proceedings in divorce cases are equitable, in which this
Court may review the evidence, due to the prerogatives
and advantaged position of the trial court, we give
considerable deference to his findings and judgment; and
we do not disturb them unless the evidence clearly
preponderates to the contrary, or he has abused his
discretion, or misapplied principles of law.
558 P.2d at 515-516 (footnote citations omitted). It is, therefore, incumbent upon
the Appellant in a divorce case to demonstrate some clear abuse of discretion or
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misapplication of law before this Court may act to revise any aspect of the original
Decree.
In view of the amount of discretion accorded to the trial judge and
the requirement that a clear abuse of that discretion or misapplication of law be
demonstrated as a condition precedent to any modification of the trial judge's ruling,
the cases have frequently noted that the mere fact that a majority of the members
of the reviewing court might, themselves, have reached a different plan of
distribution than did the trial court, is insufficient to justify any modification of the
original Decree. The Utah Supreme Court emphasized this principle in Christensen
v. Christensen, 21 Utah 2d 263, 444 P.2d 511 (1968), noting:
Whether we as individual judges would or would not
have arrived at the exact same formula as to what the
most practical and just treatment of the economic
espects [sic] of this situation is not the question on this
appeal. Even though it is the established rule that
divorce cases being in equity, it is the duty of this court
to review and weigh the evidence, it is equally true that
we have invariably recognized the advantaged position of
the trial judge and given deference to his findings and
judgment, declaring that they should not be upset unless
the evidence clearly preponderates against them, or unless
the decree works such an injustice that equity and good
conscience demand that it be revised. . . .
444 P.2d at 512-13 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
This Court has ardently adhered to the standard of review
consistently articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in divorce cases. For example,
this Court recently stated in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 58,
767 P.2d 121 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), that:

Trial courts have considerable discretion to adjust
divorcing parties' financial and property interests. . . .
Moreover, the trial court's actions are entitled to a
presumption of validity. . . . Absent a showing of a
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, we will not
interfere with an alimony or property award. . . .
98 Utah Adv. Rep. at 59, 767 P.2d at 122 (numerous citations omitted). Similarly,
in its decision in Rasband v. Rasband, 80 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988), this Court began its analysis with the observation that:
This court will not disturb the trial court's award of
spousal support absent a showing of a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion. . . .
80 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32, 752 P.2d at 1333 (emphasis added, citation omitted).
Under the standard of review traditionally applied by both this
Court and the Utah Supreme Court, the alimony award in this case is presumed
valid and will be affirmed unless Mr. Van Wagoner has demonstrated that Judge
Moffat has so clearly abused his discretion as to result in substantial prejudice or has
misapplied the relevant law of this state to such a degree that the Decree entered
is manifestly unfair and inequitable.
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POINT II; APPELLANT HAS ENTIRELY FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF
DEMONSTRATING SOME ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR MISAPPLICATION
OF LAW; THEREFORE, THE ALIMONY AWARD SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Although Appellant's Brief makes clear Mr. Van Wagoner's
subjective dissatisfaction with the alimony award entered by Judge Moffat, it wholly
fails to delineate a single instance in which the District Court either abused its
discretion or misapplied the relevant law of this state. Mr. Van Wagoner candidly
acknowledges that he has been unable to find, to support his appeal, any "Utah case
[which] has reversed a trial court's award of permanent alimony." (App. Br. at 12.)
Faced with the absence of any analogous cases, Mr. Van Wagoner cites a series of
Utah cases in which the trial court's failure to award permanent alimony was
reversed. He then makes the logically unsound argument that since the circumstances
of these parties do not meet some of the factors held in those cases to require the
reversal of the failure to award permanent alimony, the District Court's award of
permanent alimony in this case constitutes error.
Even brief consideration of the principle relied upon by
Mr. Van Wagoner demonstrates its unsoundness. As discussed in Point I, supra,
Utah trial courts are accorded great deference in fashioning alimony awards and that
discretion will not be supplanted on appeal absent clearly manifest abuse. It is
obvious, therefore, that factual circumstances of sufficient severity to require reversal
of a trial court's failure to award permanent alimony cannot reasonably be relied
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upon as defining the minimum circumstances justifying the award of permanent
alimony.
The criteria for alimony awards in Utah have been consistently
articulated and adhered to by both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court. For
example, within the past year, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the criteria to be
considered by the trial court in determining alimony in Noble v. Noble, 89 Utah Adv.
Rep. 3, 761 P.2d 1369 (1988), holding:
We accord the trial courts broad discretion in awarding
alimony so long as the trial court exercises its discretion
"in accordance with the standards that have been set by
this Court." . . . We require that a trial court, in setting
alimony, attempt to provide support for the receiving spouse
sufficient to maintain that spouse as nearly as possible at
the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. In
determining the amount of the award necessary to
accomplish this aim, the trial court must make adequate
findings and conclusions demonstrating that it has
considered three factors: (i) the financial condition and
needs of the party seeking alimony, (ii) that party's
ability to produce a sufficient income, and (iii) the ability
of the other party to provide support. . . .
98 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4, 761 P.2d at 1372 (emphasis added, citations omitted). This
Court, also, has discussed within the past year the relevant factors to be analyzed in
awarding alimony, in cases such as Rasband v. Rasband, 80 Utah Adv. Rep. 32,
752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), in which it instructed:
An alimony award should, to the extent possible,
equalize the parties9 respective post-divorce living standards
and maintain them at a level as close as possible to that
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. . . . The
Utah Supreme Court has articulated three factors that
must be considered by the trial court in determining a
reasonable alimony award: (1) the financial conditions
9

and needs of the requesting spouse; (2) the ability of the
requesting spouse to produce a sufficient income for
himself or herself; and (3) the ability of the other spouse
to provide support. . . .
80 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32, 752 P.2d at 1333 (emphasis added, citations omitted). This
Court went on, in that case, to reverse the trial court's failure to award permanent
alimony.
As found by the District Court, Mr. Van Wagoner is a skillful and
prominent civil litigator whose income in 1985 and 1986 averaged at least $70,000.00
per year exclusive of his substantial contingent fee in a major wrongful death case.
On the other hand, Mrs. Van Wagoner was found by the District Court to be
earning $9,600.00 per year.2

On this appeal, Mr. Van Wagoner argues that

Mrs. Van Wagoner could earn $16,000.00 per year as a school teacher if she
obtained the required certificate.3 Even assuming the accuracy of the $16,000.00 per
year figure alleged by Mr. Van Wagoner, it is blatantly obvious that his annual
income (in excess of $70,000.00 per year) is immensely greater than hers (which he
claims is $16,000.00 per year and which the trial court found to be $9,600.00 per
year).

2

The District Court's finding is expressed in terms of a monthly income of
$800.00 per month. (Amended Findings of Fact at 516, R. at 447, reproduced infra,
at A-7.)
3

The trial court made no such finding of fact, but Respondent does not believe
that the $500.00 per month disparity between the actual income found by the trial
court and the alleged potential income claimed by Appellant is material to the
outcome of this appeal.

\
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Both parties are, as the trial court found, healthy and capable of
employment. This fact does not, however, diminish the disparity of income earning
capability between the parties. Moreover, the disparity is not surprising given the
circumstances of these parties. It must be remembered that, at the time of the
marriage, Mrs. Van Wagoner gave up her plans for a career as a flight attendant.
(Stipulated Statement of Facts at 53, R. at 617, reproduced infra at A-2.) The parties
then moved to North Carolina so that Mr. Van Wagoner could attend law school
and Mrs. Van Wagoner supported the parties by teaching. (Id. at 56). Following
Mr. Van Wagoner's graduation from law school, he obtained employment first with
a firm here in Salt Lake City and then with the O'Melveny & Myers firm in Los
Angeles (Id. at Jf 8 and 9) while Mrs. Van Wagoner remained at home rearing the
parties' three children, who were born between 1975 and 1981 (Id. at f 2). For more
than twelve years, Mrs. Van Wagoner was not employed, but instead devoted herself
to the rearing of the parties' children and a number of volunteer civic projects. (Id.
at I f 10 and 11.)
Far from constituting an abuse of discretion, the District Court's
award of modest permanent alimony in this case was appropriate and entirely
consistent with firmly established precedent. In Olsen v. Olsen, 15 Utah Adv. Rep.
8, 704 P.2d 564 (1985), the Utah Supreme Court was faced with parties whose joint
financial condition it described as "an economic disaster." The Utah Supreme Court
held that while the amount of the alimony award was well below that which would
maintain the standard the living enjoyed by the wife during the marriage, it was
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"reasonable in light of the limited family resources available to fulfill her needs."
The Court ruled that it was error, however, for the trial court to have failed to make
the award permanent. (15 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10, 704 P.2d at 564.) Likewise in the
present case, Judge Moffat aptly noted that the parties would not be able to
continue the standard of living that they had both enjoyed during the marriage
(Memorandum Decision R. at 334), but this does not mean that it was inappropriate
for Judge Moffat to award permanent alimony in the modest amount of $650.00 per
month to Mrs. Van Wagoner given Mr. Van Wagoner's clearly demonstrated
substantial income earning capabilities.
Similarly, Judge Moffat's decision is entirely consistent with the
numerous decisions of this Court, such as Andersen v. Andersen, 85 Utah Adv.
Rep. 17, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), in which it was held that the trial court
erred in failing to make permanent a $300.00 per month alimony award; and
Rasband v. Rasband, 80 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), in
which this Court reversed as erroneous the trial court's failure to award permanent
alimony in a reasonable amount. The District Court's permanent alimony award in
this case is also in line with the ruling of the Utah Supreme Court in Paffel v. Paffel,
48 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 732 P.2d 96 (1986), in which it was faced with a husband's
challenge of permanent alimony. Based upon the disparity in the income producing
capabilities of the parties, the Court rejected the husband's contention that the
alimony awarded ought not have been permanent and upheld the award of
permanent alimony. (48 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16, 732 P.2d at 104.)

12
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In light of the extreme disparity between Mr. Van Wagoner's
earning capabilities (almost all of which were acquired during the tenure of the
marriage) and those of Mrs. Van Wagoner (who was not required to work during
the last twelve years of the 19-year marriage), the most appropriate response to the
contention that Judge Moffat erred in making permanent the modest alimony award
may well be the observation of the Utah Supreme Court in response to a similar
contention by a dissatisfied husband in Frank v. Frank, 585 P.2d 453 (Utah 1978):
How the [husband], or anyone on his behalf, could even
suggest that a wife who had devoted 21 years to her
marriage and reared a family should be turned out to
subsist on her own is as discordant to our sense of justice
as it was to the trial judge.
585 P.2d at 455. This observation would appear equally applicable to the present
case.

POINT III: RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED HER COUNSEL FEES ON
THIS APPEAL.
Due to Mr. Van Wagoner's dissatisfaction with Judge Moffat's
alimony award, Mrs. Van Wagoner has now been burdened with the cost of this
appeal. Even before the adoption of express provisions such as Rule 33 of the Rules
of the Utah Court of Appeals, and its counterpart, Rule 33 of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court had frequently held that, in such
circumstances, an award is appropriate to cover the added costs necessitated by the
dissatisfied former spouse's appeal. For example, in Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569 P.2d
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1104 (Utah 1977), the husband, disenchanted with the trial judge's award, appealed
with the usual contention that it was unfair and inequitable. The original Decree
was affirmed and the case remanded to the trial court for the assessment and award
of attorney's fees incurred by the wife as a result of the appeal:
Inasmuch as the plaintiff has been put to the necessity
of defending this appeal, which we have found to be
without merit, it is our opinion that she is justified in her
request for a further award of attorney's fees in addition
to the modest amount of $200 allowed her in the trial
court.
569 P.2d at 1106. To the same effect are Fletcher v. Fletcher, 516 P.2d 218 (Utah
1980); and Baker v. Baker, 551 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1976).
In view of the fact that not a single Utah case supports
Mr. Van Wagoner's position, in view of the fact that the District Court in this case
manifestly applied the criteria consistently articulated as applicable to alimony
awards, in view of the great and obvious disparity of the actual income producing
capabilities of these parties, and in view of Mr. Van Wagoner's own, personal
knowledge of and familiarity with legal matters, it is appropriate, both under case
precedent and the provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals,
that Mrs. Van Wagoner be reimbursed for those additional expenses necessitated by
this groundless appeal.

14
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CONCLUSION
During this marriage, Mr. Van Wagoner completed his
undergraduate education, attended law school, was associated with one of the west
coast's most prestigious law firms, and now heads his own lucrative practice.
Mrs. Van Wagoner, on the other hand, worked as a waitress and school teacher to
fund his education, then devoted her life to rearing the parties' family and
performing volunteer civic services, and now earns less than $10,000 per year and
has, Mr. Van Wagoner alleges, the capability of earning $16,000.00 per year. Under
these circumstances, Mr. Van Wagoner's contention that the District Court's award
of permanent alimony at the rate of $650.00 per month was an abuse of discretion
is entirely without merit.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of June, 1989.

DART, ADAMSON & £ASTOG

. :?J6/
Bert L. Dart
PARKEN & KECK

By JOHN D. PARKEN
John D. Parken
Counsel for Respondent
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EDWARD W. CLYDE 0685
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW
Suite 200
77 West Second South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-2516
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MARK O. VAN WAGONER,
STIPULATED STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant and Defendant,
vs.

Civil No. D 85-3792

CAROL VAN WAGONER,
Judge Pichard H. Moffat
Respondent and Plaintiff

Come now the parties, through their respective attorneys of
record, and stipulate that a transcript of the evidence is not
available and this Stipulated Statement of Facts is made and
agreed upon pursuant to Rule 11(g) of the Utah Court of Appeals:
1.

Plaintiff/Respondent <*as born in Seattle, Washington, on

June 13, 1947; the Defendant/Appellant was born in Utah on March
16, 1947. Both have been and now are in good health.
2.
1970.
namely:

The parties were married on the 9th day of September,
Three children have been born as issue of that marriage;
Erin

Van

Wagoner,

born

March

19,

1975;

Gavin

i

A-9

Van Wagoner, born January

25, 1978; Morgan Van Wagoner, born

January 22, 1981•
3.
Brigham

In the Spring of 1969 while Respondent was attending
Young

University,

she

applied

and

was

accepted

training as a stewardess for Pan American Airlines.

for

It was the

intent of Respondent prior to meeting the Appellant to become a
stewardess.

While waiting for Pan American training school to

begin in September, she met the Appellant.

A romantic relation-

ship developed and the parties through discussions agreed that
the Respondent should change her plans and remain in Provo.

She

did so> rescheduling the Pan American training school in Florida
to the Summer of 1970.
the

spring

of

1971

Thereafter through the fall of 1970 and

Respondent

enrolled

in

a

three-semester

program at the Brigham Young University, which was necessary for
a teaching certificate.

Such a certificate was obtained after

the parties moved to North Carolina, and Respondent was certified
to teach school in Utah and North Carolina.

Respondent has not

maintained the certificate and would need to be recertified if
she were to teach.

She has, however, completed four to five

hours of the nine hours required for recertification.
4.

Immediately

before

her

marriage

to

the

Appellant,

Respondent was working part-time as a waitress at Sambo*s Restaurant in Provo, Utah.

The parties were engaged in 1970 and the

Respondent quit her job at Sambo! s to begin the aforementioned
three-semester program at BYU needed to obtain her Utah teaching
certificate.

A-3

5.

Appellant completed work for an undergraduate degree in

history at the BYU.

While attending school, he worked part-time

as a teaching assistant in the History Department and part-time
as a

fry

cook.

The

summer

immediately

before

the marriage

Appellant worked full-time as a fry cook and Respondent worked
full-time as a hostess at a local restaurant.

Appellant was

accepted in the Fall of 1970 to study law at Duke University,
6.

In the summer of 1971 Appellant and Respondent travelled

to Durham, North Carolina, where the Appellant began law school
studies and Respondent began teaching.

Between the fall of 1971

and the spring of 19 74 Respondent taught elementary school in the
Orange and Durham County school districts in North Carolina.

She

worked full-time as a teacher while Appellant was in law school.
7.

Appellant's law school expense was paid for by a combin-

ation of scholarship money from Duke University and gifts from
his parents.
8.

After Appellant graduated from law school the parties

moved to Salt Lake City, where he was employed by a local lawfirm.

From this point forward Appellant began to provide almost

100% of the marital income.
9.

In 1977 Appellant accepted employment with a Los Angeles

law firm, O'Melveny & Myers and the parties moved to Los Angeles.
The work assignment from that law firm enabled the parties to
travel rather extensively, at the law firm's expense, to San
Francisco, and an extended trip to Europe.
10.

In 1980 Appellant changed his employment by quitting
I

his position in Los Angeles and taking a position with a law firm

(
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in Salt Lake City, Utah.

The parties again, following plain-

tiff's employment, moved from Los Angeles to Salt Lake City,
where they purchased
Club.

a large home near the Salt Lake Country

From 1980 to the filing of this action for divorce Appel-

lant worked as a lawyer and Respondent remained in the home
caring for the parties1 three children.

During this period they

purchased many items of furniture and three new automobiles.
They also were able to continue to travel extensively.
11.

After their return to Salt Lake City in 1980 Respondent

became involved in a number of volunteer projects, including
serving as president of the local PTA, became a member of a book
club and performed in a number of regular church assignments.
12.

The parties separated in June of 1985.

13.

In 1986, after the parties separated, Respondent began

working part-time at the Salt Lake Tribune.

She was working on

an average of three days a week on an 8 hours a day basis and was
paid $8 an hour.
14.

Her gross annual income from this was $9,984.

There was

testimony

from

a qualified

witness

that

Respondent had favorable and immediate employment prospects as a
teacher, and would be capable of making a minimum of $16,000 per
year over a nine-month period.

Appellant has chosen not to seek

employment as a teacher and as a matter of personal choice has
chosen her current work at the Salt Lake Tribune and to pursue a
career in newspapers.
15.

Respondent's work at the Tribune is in the Promotions

Department, and includes responding to teacher requests to visit
classrooms as one method of teaching the teachers how to use the
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newspapers as a teaching tool in the classroom.

Respondent also

from time to time works as a substitute teacher.

She worked in

this capacity a total of about 15 days in the last half of 1986. *
16.
of 1986.
17.

Respondent started her work with the Tribune in October
She is paid around $40 per day and works part-time.
The parties stipulate that the deposition of Appellant

and the deposition of Respondent may be published and transmitted
together with the exhibits as a part of the record.
18.

David Dorton, a valuation expert, testified concerning

the value of the law degree earned by Mark Van Wagoner during the
marriage.

His testimony, which was recapped in Exhibit P-23, was

that the present value of Mark Van Wagoner's law degree was the
sum of $343,200.

If it were tax adjusted, it would reduce the

value to a present value of $247,100.
Dated this ^ Q day of March, 1989.

&^h)£kf
Edward W. C l y d e , A t t o r ^ y x o i ? ^
Appellant/Defendant .

Bert L. Darx, Attorney for
Respondent/Plaintiff
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo

v.

AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
REGARDING CUSTODY AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT

MARK 0. VAN WAGONER,

Civil No. D85-3792

CAROL VAN WAGONER,
Plaintiff,

Defendant,

Judge Moffat
oooOooo

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial en
the remaining financial, issues on the 15th day of April, 1987, at
9:00 a.m., plaintiff and defendant both appearing in person and
represented by counsel and the Court having heard testimony from
each of the parties and various witnesses and exhibits having been
introduced and the matter having been argued and submitted and
taken under advisement, and the Court now being fully advised,
hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about September 15, 198 6, this Court entered

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce
which reserved issues of custody and financial issues. These
present amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law supplement
those entered in September, 198 6.
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2.

Three children have been born as issue of this

marriage, to wit:

Erin Van Wagoner, age 12, born March 19, 197 5;

Gavin Van Wagoner, age 9, born January 25, "1978; and Morgan Van
Wagoner, age 6, born March 22, 1981 (collectively, the "Minor
Children").
3.

In January, 1987, plaintiff and defendant entered

into an "Agreement regarding Civil No-. D85-3762" (the "Agreement")
regarding the care, custody, control and visitation regarding the
minor children.

A true and correct copy of the Agreement is

attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and its terms are incorporated
herein by this reference.

The Court hereby adopts that Agreement

and finds the terms of that Agreement to be fair, reasonable and
just; and makes the terms of that Agreement part of these
Findings.
4.

During the marriage the parties acquired certain

household furnishings and effects and other personal property.

It

is reasonable, fair and just that the household furnishings and
effects and other personal and real property accumulated by the
parties during their marriage be divided as follows:
a.

Plaintiff is entitled to receive and after

receipt shall be fully responsible for:
(i)

The 1977 Volvo automobile,

(ii) The bank accounts presently in
plaintiff's name.
(iii) The sum of $500 which represents one-half
of marketable securities held by defendant and valued at $1,000.
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(iv)

All household furnishings and effects and

other marital personal property presently in plaintiff's
possession, except as provided in Paragraph 4(b)(iv) below.
(v)

One-half of the parties joint IRA account,

which half is valued at $1,000.
(vi)

The Delta Airlines stock or any proceeds

from its sale.
(vii)
(viii)

The parties1 1984 income tax refund.
The piano which should remain with

plaintiff but in the event it is to be disposed of by the
plaintiff at any time in the future or is to be stored for any
period of time and not utilized for music lessons for the children
it should become the property of the defendant and should be
promptly surrendered to the defendant by the plaintiff free of any
liens and encumbrances.
(ix)

All other household furnishings and

effects and other personal property acquired by plaintiff
subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 21, 1985.
b. Defendant is entitled to receive and after
receipt shall be fully responsible for the following:
(i)

The bank accounts presently in defendant's

own name.
(ii)
(iii)

Cash in defendant's possession.
The marketable securities held by

defendant valued at $1,000.

3
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(iv)

All of the household furniture

furnishings and effects and other personal property presently in
defendant's possession and the following household furniture,
furnishings and effects and other personal property presently in
plaintiff's possession, namely, the JVC video camera, two pieces
of artwork of defendant's choice, one Lladro sculpture of
defendant's choice and defendant's tools other than tools necesary
for yard care such as rake, hoe, shovel, etc.
(v)

Gavin's bedroom furniture should remain

with Gavin so long as it is in his use but should be transferred
to the possesion of defendant if not used by Gavin.
(vi)

All other household furnishings and

effects and other personal property acquired by defendant
subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 21, 1985.
5.

During the marriage of the parties defendant became

involved in a wrongful death action involving a sign which fell
from a Smith's Food King store.

No order is made at this time

concerning the proceeds, if any, from this litigation to which
defendant may become entitled and at such time as this case is
resolved defendant should notify plaintiff so that at that time
the Court can make a determination of.whether any distribution of
such proceeds is appropriate.
6.

Shortly before the filing of this action defendant

received a partnership payout from his former law firm of
$24,3 00.

Defendant has shown the distribution of this fund

reflecting that $19,168 went against joint debts of the parties,
4
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$2,402 went against defendant's debts, $1,930 went against
plaintiff's debts and $800 went to a childrens* trip.

The Court

finds this distribution to be equitable and the funds having been
expended, the Court makes no further order concerning these items.
7.

In 1986, following the filing of this action,

defendant received a profit sharing payout of $10,788, Defendant
has shown the distribution of these assets in a fashion which the
Court finds to be equitable and the funds having been expended,
the Court make no further order concerning these items.
8.

The parties own that certain real property

situated at 2195 Parley's Terrace, Salt Lake City, Utah.

It is

the view of the Court that the parties even prior to the
separation were living at a financial level that cannot be
sustained.

If that is a fact it is even more obvious that having

separated they cannot continue to each be sustained at the same
level that existed before.

Based upon the current financial

circumstances of the parties the Court finds that the house and
real property at 2195 Parley's Terrace, Salt Lake City, Utah
should be listed immediately for sale with Kay Berger, a multiple
listing realtor.

Plaintiff should be ordered to cooperate with

Kay Berger in doing whatever Kay Berger desires or requests in the
way of cooperation to assist in the sale of said property
including but not limited to maintaining the residence in a neat,
attractive and orderly fashion as it enhance its likelihood of a
sale.

5
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Until the house and real property at 2195 Parleys
Terrace is sold, plaintiff should be responsible for payment of
the first mortgage obligation and each of the parties should be
responsible for 50 percent of the insurance and 50 percent of the
taxes.

If either party pays more than his or her proportionate

share of insurance or taxes, the overpayment should become a lien
against the defaulting party's proceeds from the home.
Upon the sale of said house and real property the funds
received therefor shall be escrowed and applied as follows:
a.

To pay all of the expenses of the sale such as

real estate commissions, title reports and title insurance,
proration of taxes and other standard closing costs.
b.

The note to Vivian McCarthy will be paid in

full or assumed by the buyer.
c.

The balance will be allocated one-half to the

plaintiff and one-half to the defendant.
d.

From defendant's one-half there shall be paid

from the escrow in the following priority:
(i)

B. L. Dart, Esq., as provided for herein

in paragraph 22.
(ii)
(iii)

Defendant's obligation to the IRS.
Defendant's obligation to Zions First

National Bank.
e.

If either party shall have paid any debt or

obligation of the other relating to said house and real property,
-or relating to the two obligations to Zions First National Bank or

6
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the 1985 income tax return on which the parties have a shared
liability,;any such payment shall be reimbursed with interest at
eight percent per annum from the time of the advance until the
time of payment•

The payment shall be made directly from the

escrow.
f.

The balance of plaintiff's allocated share

shall be distributed to plaintiff and the balance of defendant's
allocated share shall be distributed to defendant.
9.

The parties own an interest in certain other real

property located on the Southwest corner of Third South and West
Temple Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah (the "West Temple
Property"), which property interest should be awarded one-half to
plaintiff and one-half to defendant.

In the event of sale, the

parties should share equally in the sales proceeds and in the
future until such sale, each party should pay equally in the costs
and expenses applicable to this property.

In the event either

party fails to pay his or her share of any assessment or
obligation against the property ten days prior to the due date,
the other party may pay such assessment and it should work a
forfeiture of the non-paying party's interest in the property to
the party making the payment.

Defendant is currently the partner

in the West Temple property and should provide to the plaintiff
notice as soon as he receives it of any assessment so that
plaintiff will have as much notice as possible of any assessment
amount and due date.
m
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Defendant should be awarded all right, title and

interest in and to his partnership interest in the law firm of
Van Wagoner and Stevens, as well as his proportionate share of all
assets and income of such firm.

Provided that this award of the

partnership interest does not supersede or in any way affect the
provisions of paragraph 5 hereof relating to the Smith's Food King
suit.
The Court also finds that defendant's education
and professional degree are not property interests and, as such,
cannot be subject to division between the parties, but such
education and degree are relevant and have been taken into
consideration by the Court in the award of alimony hereinafter
provided.
11.

Various debts and obligations have been incurred

by the parties during the marriage which should be assumed and
paid as follows:
a.

Plaintiff should pay, settle or otherwise

compromise if not already done and should indemnify defendant from
the following obligations:
(i)

All debts allocated to plaintiff under

prior orders of this Court.
(ii)

All currently outstanding debts incurred

by plaintiff subsequent to the separation of the parties on June
21, 1985, in connection with charge cards or similar accounts.
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(iii)

The outstanding principal and interest

on any loans incurred by plaintiff subsequent to the separation
of the parties on June 21, 1985.
(iv)

All separate tax liabilities incurred by

plaintiff subsequent to January 1, 1986.
(v)

All other debts incurred by plaintiff

prior and subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 21,
1985.
(vi)

One-half of the outstanding principal and

interest owing to Zions First National Bank for a balloon payment,
which half is valued at approximately $2,900.00.
(vii)

One-half of the obligation owing to

Zions First National Bank regarding Taylor, which half is valued
at approximately $10,825.00.
(viii)

One-fourth of the currently outstanding

income tax liability for the 1985 tax year in the approximate sum
of $2,000 subject to defendant providing documentation of the
exact value of this obligation.
b.

Defendant should pay, settle or otherwise

compromise if not already done and should indemnify plaintiff from
the debts and obligations owing as follows:
(i)

All debts allocated to defendant under

prior orders of this Court.
(ii)

All debts incurred by defendant prior and

subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 21, 19 85 in
connection with charge cards or similar accounts.

9
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(iii)

The outstanding principal and interest

owning on any loans incurred by defendant subsequent to the
separation of the parties on June 21, 1985.
(iv)

All separate tax liabilities incurred by

defendant subsequent to January 1, 1986.
(v)

One-half of the outstanding principal and

interest owing to Zions First National Bank for a balloon payment,
which half is valued at approximately $2,900.00.
(vi)

One-half of the obligation owing to Zions

First National Bank regarding Taylor, which half is valued at
approximately $10,825.00.
•(vii)

Three-fourths of the income tax

liability for 1985, which three-fourths is in the approximate sum
of $6,000 subject to defendant providing documentation of the
exact value of this obligation.
(viii)

Except as to the Smith's Food King case

which is to be governed solely by paragraph 5 hereof, and is not
modified hereby all liabilities incurred in connection with
defendant's law practice.
c.

Any debts and obligations not listed in

paragraph 11(a) or 11(b) above should be paid as follows:
(i)

Those incurred on behalf of plaintiff

should be paid, settled and compromised solely by plaintiff.
(ii)

Those incurred on behalf of defendant

should be paid, settled and compromised solely by defendant.
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12.

Except as specifically provided herein, and to the

extent that assets have been disclosed by the parties, it is
reasonable, fair and just that neither party shall have any
interest in any property of the other, real or personal, tangible
or intangible.
13.

It is reasonable, fair and just that plaintiff

shall not at any time contract any debts, charges or liabilities
whatsoever for which defendant, his legal representatives, heirs
and assigns, or his or their property or estate shall or may
become liable and will at all times keep and save harmless
defendant, his legal representatives, heirs and assigns from any
and all debts, charges or liabilities hereafter contracted or
incurred by plaintiff, other than those debts specified in
paragraph 11(b) above.

Similarly, it is reasonable, fair and just

that defendant shall not at any time contract any debts, charges
or liabilities whatsoever for which plaintiff, her legal
representatives, heirs and assigns, or her or their property or
estate shall or may become liable and will at all times keep and
save harmless plaintiff, her legal representatives, heirs and
assigns from any and all debts, charges or liabilities hereafter
contracted or incurred by defendant, other than those debts
specified in paragraph 11(a) above.
14.

It is reasonable, fair and just that both parties

shall promptly cause all joint accounts and credit cards, whatever
type, to be cancelled or changed to separate accounts.
m
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15.

So long as defendant is current on his obligation

of support for;the applicable tax year, he should be entitled to

»

claim the two oldest children of the parties as dependents for
state and federal income tax purposes and plaintiff should execute
any documents necessary to allow these exemptions to be taken by
defendant.

Plaintiff should be allowed to declare the youngest

child of the parties as her dependent.
16.

Both parties are healthy, able-bodied persons

capable of gainful employment.

Based upon the testimony and

exhibits of the parties, the Court finds that plaintiff is
currently employed three days a week at the Salt Lake Tribune
earning a gross monthly income of $800 a month.

Defendant is

currently employed as a lawyer and during the past two years has
averaged a gross annual income of approximately $70,000 each
year.
17.

Based upon the current financial circumstances of

the parties, defendant should pay to plaintiff for the benefit of
the minor children of the parties child support payments in the
amount of $500 per month per child which obligation should
continue to the age of majority and thereafter to high school
graduation for any child reaching majority before high school
graduation.

As a further obligation of support, defendant should

continue to maintain the children on his currently existing policy
of health and accident insurance.

Medical, dental and orthodontia

expenses not covered by insurance should be paid 1/3 by the
m
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plaintiff and 2/3 by the defendant.

Defendant's obligation to pay

support should terminate upon the death of defendant.
18.

Based upon the current financial circumstances of

the parties defendant should pay to plaintiff as alimony the sum
of $1,050 per month commencing with the month of July, 1987, for a
period of one year, at which time alimony should reduce to $800
per month for a period of one year, at which time it should reduce
to $650 per month.

Plaintiff's entitlement to alimony should

continue until such time as plaintiff should remarry, cohabit or
die or defendant should die, whichever event occurs first, but to
be subject to modification pursuant to applicable Utah law.
19.

Alimony and support payments should be paid one-

half by the 5th of the month and one-half by the 20th of the month
in each month they are due.
20.

It is reasonable, fair and just that plaintiff and

defendant should each keep the other party informed, at all times,
of his/her current resident address and telephone number, as well
as that of his/her employer.
21.

It is reasonable, fair and just that the parties

should execute and deliver all documents, provide all information,
and take or forebear from all such action as may be necessary or
appropriate to achieve the purposes hereof.
22.

Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees

and costs incurred in this divorce action in the sum of
$17,24 6.23, which attorney's fees and costs the Court finds to be
reasonable and based upon plaintiff's financial circumstances an
m
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amount for which plaintiff has need.

Plaintiff's attorney's fees

and costs should be paid by the defendant out of his equity
derived from the sale of the home of parties.
23.

Until the residence is sold defendant should be

ordered upon plaintiff's request to co-sign with plaintiff on an
automobile loan to the amount of $4,000 to assist plaintiff in
obtaining transportation for her and the minor children of the
parties, which loan payment should be the obligation of plaintiff
and repaid upon the sale of the residence.
24.

Because of past problems between the parties, the

Court was asked to determine whether either party has the right of
offset against the other for obligations between the parties.

The

Court expressly finds that neither party should engage in "self
help" or offset and, specifically, defendant should not withhold
either alimony or support from plaintiff based upon claims of
offset for other obligations from plaintiff to defendant.

The

Court is not intending to supersede the ultimate right, under Utah
law to offset, but is merely directing that the offset not be made
without court approval insofar as alimony and support money is
concerned.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has personal jurisdiction over plaintiff

and defendant, and over the subject matter of this action.
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2.

Plaintiff is awarded the care custody and control

of the minor children of the parties in accordance with the
Agreement between the parties attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
3.

The real and personal property of the parties

acquired during this marriage is awarded as provided in paragraphs
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 12 of the Findings of Fact.
4.

The obligations of the parties are to be assumed

and paid on the terms and in the manner provided in paragraphs 11,
13 and 14 of the Findings of Fact.
5.

Plaintiff is awarded support from defendant for

the minor children of the parties in the amount and upon the terms
provided in paragraphs 17 and 19 of the Findings of Fact,
6.

Plaintiff is awarded alimony from defendant in the

amount and upon the terms provided in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the
Findings of Fact.
7.

Plaintiff is awarded a judgment for the use and

benefit of her attorney for fees and costs in the sum of
$17,246.23, which shall be paid by defendant out of his equity
derived from the sale of the home of the parties.
8.

Defendant is ordered to co-sign with plaintiff on

an automobile loan to the amount of $4,000 pursuant to the terms
and conditions provided in paragraph 23 of the Findings of Fact.
9.

So long as defendant is current on his obligation

for support for the applicable tax year he shall be entitled to
declare the two oldest children of the parties as dependents for
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state and federal income tax purposes and plaintiff is ordered to
execute any documents necessary to allow these exemptions to be
taken by defendant.
10.

Each party is ordered to execute any documents

necessary to effectuate the terms of the Decree of Divorce entered
on these Findings of Fact ajid Conclusions of Law.
DATED this

3

day of ^1n^i4iri

—3^8 8.

t

ATTEST
H. DIXON H1NDLEY
,CLERK

APPROVAL AS TO FORM:

£u,-2*i$

FAT
Judge
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...

Oiipoiy 'Clerk

EDWARD W. CLYDE

Attorney for Defendan
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